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1 Introduction
In most developed economies, the nancing of entitlement programs or commitments to
the existing generations (i.e., social security and health care) will likely pose very serious
scal challenges in the near future. Many potential reforms involve substantial changes
in economic e¢ciency and intergenerational redistribution. The magnitude of these scal
adjustments, the distribution of the tax burden across di¤erent cohorts and the welfare
implications depend on the specics of the tax reforms. It is then essential to have reliable
estimates of the implications of alternative reforms.1 A commonly used tool is generational
accounting, rst described in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotliko¤ (1991), that measures the
distribution of the tax burden across di¤erent cohorts (see Kotliko¤, 1992, 2002, for a full
description of the methodology), comparing the lifetime tax bills (net of transfers) of present
and future cohorts.2
This paper evaluates the ability of generational accounting metrics to capture the identity
of the cohorts who benet from or bear the cost of policy reforms. Using data generated
by the model provides the perfect laboratory to measure tax incidence. Within the context
of a theoretical model in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987), we argue that when
reforms generate large changes in e¢ciency the generational accounts do not identify well the
identity and magnitude of welfare changes. We proceed by computing the dynamic response
of our model economy to a given reform, take the model generated data and compute the
generational accounts on the articial data. The evaluation stage compares the performance
of the model generational accounts with the model quantitative predictions about welfare
changes for di¤erent cohorts.
Of course, this way of proceeding assumes exact knowledge of the general equilibrium
e¤ects and the behavioral responses to policies when computing the generational accounts.
This might be the case when evaluating policies ex-post (once their implications are observed,
if at all possible), but this is for sure not possible when trying to evaluate the potential
impact of policies not yet implemented. Still we show that, even if we had all the correct
information available in terms of behavioral responses and price implications, generational
accounts might generate a misleading picture of the welfare implications of policies. The
reason is that policies often imply changes in economic e¢ciency that for some cohorts
would result in simultaneous increase in welfare and a larger tax burden.
To compare the compare generational accounts and welfare we use the following criteria.
We will argue that the generational accounts capture the sign and magnitude of welfare
1The literature builds on the seminal contribution of Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987). It is impossible to
provide a comprehensive list of references here, see for example Altig et al. (2001); Conesa and Krueger
(1999); Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009); Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2007); or Nishiyima and
Smetters (2007).
2Gokhale et al. (2000) analyze the U.S. use of the long-term projections of the Congressional Budget
O¢ce. The authors calculate the magnitudes of adjustment through alternative policies that could solve
future imbalances. Other applications include a switch from income to consumption taxation (as in Altig et
al., 2001) or Social Security privatization (as in Kotliko¤, Smetters, and Walliser, 2001), and a cross country
analysis (as in Kotliko¤ and Ra¤elheuschen, 1991).
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changes if, whenever generational accounting determines that a particular cohort will pay
X% more taxes over its life-cycle (as a share of lifetime income), we observe that for that
particular cohort there is a decrease in welfare roughly equivalent to an X% decrease in
consumption over its life-cycle (as a share of lifetime income).
In our model economy, we consider rst two specic reforms that have been widely dis-
cussed in the actual policy debate. The rst reform is a switch from income to consumption
taxation, as has been often discussed in the literature (see for example Altig et al., 2001).
The second reform eliminates restrictions on labor market participation for individuals col-
lecting social security benets (i.e., the type of reforms that were implemented in the US in
the late nineties). Within the context of our model economy, this second reform can also
be interpreted as a delay in retirement age. We show that in the rst reform (increasing
consumption taxes and decreasing labor income taxes) the intergenerational redistribution
component dominates, and then the generational accounts do a very good job of identifying
the identity and magnitude of welfare changes. In contrast, in the second reform (allow-
ing for people to work after age 65) e¢ciency considerations dominate, and we show that
generational accounts do not perform well in identifying welfare changes.
Based on these results, we perform an additional experiment based on the optimal s-
cal policy approach in overlapping generations economies of Erosa and Gervais (2002) and
Garriga (1999). As in Conesa and Garriga (2008a,b), we solve for the optimal scal policy
given an explicit target of intergenerational redistribution of welfare changes. This analysis
helps to clarify the distinction between e¢ciency considerations and intergenerational redis-
tribution. The reason is that this exercise brings the economy to the constrained Pareto
frontier (thus maximizing constrained e¢ciency), while allowing for the explicit comparison
of di¤erent points along that frontier (intergenerational redistribution).While the explicit
policies that solve this programming problem might not be policies that are under consid-
eration, we still believe the exercise is useful because of its ability to cleanly decompose
the impact of reforms between their e¢ciency and redistributive components. In addition,
it provides evidence that our conclusions are not an artifact of the specic policy reforms
considered. Indeed, our exercise conrms the main insight from the evaluation of our two ex-
ogenous reforms: Generational accounting performs very well when comparing policies that
imply di¤erent points along the constrained Pareto frontier, while it performs very poorly in
evaluating policies that bring the economy from an interior point to the frontier.
Both our exogenous reforms and the optimal policy exercise highlight the main mech-
anism behind our quantitative results. Increasing e¢ciency, bringing the economy to the
constrained Pareto frontier (in the case of optimal reforms) or closer to it (in the case of
exogenous reforms), is mostly the result of changes in the age-prole of hours worked and
consumption. When evaluating these types of reforms generational accounts are in general
misleading, since welfare changes and the magnitude of the change in the net present value of
consumption are very di¤erent objects. In contrast, redistributive reforms in general increase
the age-prole of consumption of some cohorts at the expense of others. In that second case,
generational accounts capture the change in the net present value of consumption and give
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an accurate picture of welfare changes of the reform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the methodology
of generational accounting. Section 3 describes the benchmark model used in the analysis.
Section 4 and 5 consider various exogenous and endogenous tax policy reforms. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Methodology of Generational Accounting
The generational accounting methodology was developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kot-
liko¤ (1991) with the objective of measuring the generational incidence of tax policy inde-
pendent of scal taxonomy labels (see Kotliko¤ (1992, 2002) for a full description of the
methodology). The approach compares the lifetime net tax bills of present and future co-
horts, and it also measures the change in the generational accounts implied by changes in
scal policy. All these di¤erent tax burden measures can be compared independently of
how scal decits are calculated. An important aspect of the methodology is the evolution
of population demographics in the government budget constraint and the measurement of
generational imbalances. The ultimate goal is to prescribe tax policies that could correct
any imbalance, so all generations bear a similar tax burden. A similar concept called equal
burden-sharing is used by Bernanke (2006). This concept is interpreted to mean that the
current generation and all future generations experience the same percentage reduction in
per capita consumption.
For the description of the methodology we closely follow Kotliko¤ (2002). The tax burden
bk;t of a cohort born in period k at time t is measured as
bk;t =
Xk+d
s=max(t;k)
R (s t)
k;s
k;t
TAXk;s: (1)
The term TAXk;s represents the projected average net tax payments made in period s by a
cohort born at time k: The term k;s=k;t describes the proportion of individuals of cohort k
alive at time t who will also be alive at time s: Therefore, it represents an actuarial present
value of the average amount of taxes paid (net of transfers) by the surviving members of
cohorts born at time k: That includes expenditures in health care, education, and other
forms of transfer programs. However, it does not impute to any specic cohort the value of
government expenditure in goods and services. The main reason is the di¢culty in assigning
the benet of government purchases to di¤erent generations.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the government can be interpreted in terms of a
metric for each cohort:
Xd
s=0
t s;tbt s;t +
X1
s=1
t+s;t+sbt+s;t+s
Rs
= Dt +
X1
s=1
Gt+s
Rs
; (2)
where k;t denotes the measure in period t of cohorts born at time k: The term bk;t represents
the per capita generational account in period t for a generation born in period k: The rst
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term in the left-hand includes all existing cohorts, while the second term adds together the
generational accounts of unborn cohorts discounted at some rate R: The terms on the right
hand side represent the government net debt Dt (nancial liabilities minus the sum of its
nancial assets and market value of public enterprises) and the present value of current and
future government expenditures fGt+sg
1
s=1:
Given the tax burden of the present generations fbt s;tg
d
s=0 and a projection of future
expenditures fGt+sg
1
s=1, it is possible to calculate as a residual the tax payments of future
generations. Following this procedure it is possible to identify intergenerational imbalances
(bt+s;t+s 6= bt s;t) and compute what policy changes (and paid by what generation) might
restore a balanced share of the burden. A common approach is to assume that productivity
and wages grow at a constant rate g > 0; so it is possible to calculate the growth-adjusted
generational account of future generations denoted by b: Formally,
Xd
s=0
t s;tbt s;t +
X1
s=1
t+s;t+sb(1 + g)
sRt s = Dt +
X1
s=t
GsR
t s:
This expression is used to determine scal adjustments (taxes, transfers, or government
expenditure) that achieve an intergenerational balance for future cohorts.
3 The Benchmark Economy and the Measurement of
Tax Incidence
This section explains in detail the methodology used to evaluate the performance of the
generational accounting metrics. Using data generated by a standard general equilibrium
overlapping generations model calibrated to the US economy, the model provides the perfect
laboratory to measure tax incidence.
3.1 The Benchmark Economy
The economy is populated by a measure of households who live for a maximum of I periods
and grows at rate n. The term 'i represents the conditional survival probability, that is
'i =Prob(alive at age i + 1jalive at age i). Therefore, s1 = 1; and si = '1  '2  :::  'i 1 is
the unconditional probability of being alive at age i. The term i denotes the measure of
households of age i, computed as i = ('ii 1)=(1 + n): For simplicity we are abstracting
here from demographic changes.
Preferences of a household born in period t depend on the stream of consumption and
leisure this household will enjoy. Thus, expected utility is given by
U(ct; lt) =
PI
i=1
i 1siu(ci;t+i 1; 1  li;t+i 1); (3)
where  > 0 represents the discount factor. The utility function is twice di¤erentiable in each
argument and satises the usual Inada conditions. Each household owns one unit of time in
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each period that they can allocate for work or leisure. One unit of time devoted to work by
a household of age i translates into "i e¢ciency units of labor in the market in exchange for
a competitive wage wt: They rent assets ai;t to rms or the government in exchange for a
competitive price, rt; and decide how much to consume and save of their disposable income.
The sequential budget constraint for a working age household is given by
ci;t + (1 + x)ai+1;t+1 = wt"ili;t + (1 + rt)ai:t   i;t; (4)
where i;t represents total taxes paid to the government and x denotes an exogenous rate
of productivity growth. Upon retirement at age ir, households do not work and receive a
public pension, in a lump-sum fashion. Their budget constraint is
ci;t + (1 + x)ai+1;t+1 = pt + (1 + rt)ai:t   i;t; (5)
The simplifying assumption here is that explicit transfers are only collected upon retire-
ment, and the rest of government expenditure is not specically allocated to any particular
cohort (we could think of it as a public good that enters utility separately).
Notice that we are assuming compulsory retirement in the benchmark economy. The
alternative interpretation of a mandatory retirement rule is to consider a conscatory tax on
labor income for ages ir and above. This alternative interpretation makes very explicit the
distortionary impact of such an institutional arrangement. We will explicitly consider the
impact of removing this restriction in the evaluation of policy reforms.
The production possibility frontier is given by an aggregate production function Yt =
F (Kt; AtLt), where Kt denotes the capital stock in period t and Lt =
PI
i=1i"ilit is aggre-
gate labor measured in e¢ciency units. Aggregate labor e¢ciency, At, grows at an exoge-
nous rate of technological progress x. The function F displays constant returns to scale, is
monotonically increasing, strictly concave, and satises the Inada conditions. The capital
stock depreciates at a constant rate : The aggregate resource constraint is given by
PI
i=1icit + (1 + x)(1 + n)kt+1   (1  )kt + gt  f(kt;
PI
i=1"ilit); (6)
where aggregate variables are deated by the growth rate of output on a balanced growth
path (1 + x)(1 + n).
The government inuences this economy through administration of the social security
program and the general budget. In the benchmark economy, these two programs are op-
erated with di¤erent budgets. Then, pensions pt are nanced through a payroll tax 
p
t and
the social security budget is balanced:
 ptwt
PI
i=1i"ilit = pt
PI
i=ir
i: (7)
On the other hand, the government tax revenue consists of consumption taxes,  ct ; labor
income taxes,  lt; capital income taxes, 
k
t , and the issuance of public debt, Bt, to nance
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an exogenously given stream of per-capita government consumption, gt. The government
expenditure constraint is given by
(1 + x)(1 + n)Bt+1 + Tt = gt + (1 + rt)Bt;
where
Tt = 
c
t
PI
i=1icit + 
l
t(1  
p
t )wt
PI
i=1i"ilit + 
k
t rt
PI
i=1iait +
PI
i=1i(1  'i 1)ait
Since there is survival uncertainty and annuity markets are not available, we assume that
the government collects the assets of the deceased households.
A market equilibrium in the baseline economy is a sequence of prices and allocations
such that (i) all consumers maximize utility subject to their corresponding budget con-
straints given policies and equilibrium prices, (ii) rms maximize prots given prices, (iii)
the government and social security budgets are satised, and (iv) markets clear and feasibility
constraints are satised.
3.2 The Parameterization of the Benchmark Economy
The choice of functional forms is fairly conventional. The households utility function takes
the form:
u(c; l) =
(c(1  l)1 )1 
1  
;
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the relative weight of consumption in the utility function and  > 0
governs the concavity of the utility function. These preferences have an implied intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption equal to 1=(1  (1  )):
The production function is Cobb-Douglas, Yt = K

t (AtLt)
1 , where  represents the
capital income share. Labor e¢ciency, At, grows at rate of x = 0:0175 per year.
A period in the model is equivalent to 5 years. Households in the model live up to
a maximum of 14 periods and retire at age 10. In chronological time, the active life of
a household starts at age 20, retires at 65, and lives at most to age 89. The survival
probabilities, 'i, are from Bell and Miller (2002), with the assumption that households die
with probability 1 when reaching age 90. The mass of newborn households (and hence the
total mass of households) grows at an annual rate n = 0:011. The endowment of e¢ciency
units is from the Hansen (1993) estimates.
In the benchmark economy, the government runs two completely independent budgets.
One is the social security budget, which operates on a balanced budget. The payroll tax is
from the data and is equal to 10.5 percent of labor income, which is Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance ([OASI], excluding Medicare and disability insurance). The assumptions about
demographics (implying a ratio of the population over 65 to the working age population of
24 percent), together with the balanced budget condition, directly determine the amount of
the public retirement pension, which is 43 percent of the average gross labor income.
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The level of government expenditure is exogenously given. It is nanced through a
consumption tax of 5 percent; a marginal tax on capital income of 33 percent; and a tax on
labor income (net of social security contributions) of 16 percent. These e¤ective tax rates
have been estimated using the methodology proposed by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
The government issues public debt to satisfy its sequential budget constraint.
The calibration strategy matches ve model parameters with ve data targets prior to
2008. The targets are: 1) The aggregate capital stock as dened by the level of xed assets in
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) statistics. In the calibration, the capital-to-output
ratio is 3 in yearly terms. 2) The ratio of outstanding government (federal, state, and local)
debt to gross domestic product (GDP) uctuates around 0.5 percent (in yearly terms). 3)
Depreciation is also from the BEA statistics and averages 12 percent of GDP. 4) Capital
income share is measured from the national accounts and averages 34 percent. 5) Households
allocate an average of one-third of their time to market activities. The parameter governing
the weight on consumption in utility, in conjunction with the curvature parameter in the
utility function, is consistent with a consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
0.5 (about an average value of the empirical estimates obtained in the literature).
Notice that all parameters are jointly determined to match the empirical targets. The
implied parameters that satisfy the targets are as follows: The discount factor is  = 1:0375,
the consumption share is  = 0:31, the curvature parameter in the utility function is  = 4,
the capital share in the production function is  = 0:34; and the depreciation rate is  =
0:044:
The level of government consumption is obtained in equilibrium to match the level of debt
observed in the data for pre-crisis times (50 percent of output). Given this parameterization,
government expenditure is 23.7 percent of output in equilibrium, and social security payments
amount to 6.9 percent of output.
3.3 The Generational Accounts of the Benchmark Economy
The construction of generational accounting metrics using the data from the model closely
follows the work of Fehr and Kotliko¤ (1996) and Kotliko¤ (2002). It is necessary to de-
termine the net tax outlets (taxes minus transfers properly discounted) for each generation.
For a given tax policy, the generational accounts for a cohort of newborn individuals is
represented by
bt =
PI 1
i=0
qt+i
qt

 ct+icit+i + 
l
t+i(1  
p
t+i)wt+i"ili;t+i + 
k
t+irt+iai;t+i   pt+i

; (8)
where q1 = 1 and qt = qt 1=(1 + (1   
k
t )rt) for t = 2; 3; :::. In contrast to empirical
applications, the theoretical model o¤ers a natural discount rate because the market-clearing
interest rate can be used. In equilibrium, the governments intertemporal budget constraint is
always satised. However, the implied individual generational accounts and imbalances need
not be consistent with the governments budget constraint unless the appropriate discount
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rate is used.3 There is an equivalent expression for the cohorts already born with a shorter
life-span. Figure 1 summarizes the model-implied generational accounts of the benchmark
economy. The generational accounts have been normalized by life-time gross income, as a
consequence the value on the axis represents the percentage of taxes or transfers as a share
of remaining lifetime income. For the initial generations alive, the metrics capture not a
total lifetime bill but, rather, remaining lifetime bills. The generational accounts are usually
positive for working cohorts but negative for retired cohorts.
For the baseline policy, the model generates a vector of utility entitlements fbUjg that
will be used to compare changes in welfare with the generational accounts.
4 Exogenous Intergenerational Policy Reforms
This section considers two parametric tax reforms often studied in the literature. The rst
one follows Altig et al. (2001) and consists of a partial replacement of labor income taxes
with consumption taxes. The second reform allows individuals to start collecting pensions
at age 65 and still continue working until age 70.
We need to make sure that our measure of welfare changes and our measure of the changes
in the generational accounts are comparable. The natural way to compute the magnitude
of welfare changes is to use the consumption equivalent variation (the percentage by which
consumption in the benchmark economy should change in all remaining periods for a given
cohort to attain the same welfare level than would be attained under the proposed reform).
We measure the change in the generational accounts as the di¤erence in lifetime taxation
relative to remaining lifetime (gross) income. Notice that absent changes in relative prices or
behavioral responses a reform that decreases my remaining lifetime income by 10% should
imply a welfare change equivalent to a decrease of 10% in consumption. In that sense our
measurement of welfare changes and the changes in tax burden are consistent.
The timing of all the exogenous reforms operates as follows. At time t = 0; the economy
is in steady state under the baseline policy and no scal reform has been anticipated by
households. At t = 1; the government announces and implements the new policy. The
macroeconomic variables adjust over time until the economy converges to the new steady
state under the new policy regime. Across policy reforms, the government expenditure is
maintained constant and consumption taxes are adjusted to balance the budget each period.
4.1 Exogenous Reform 1: Substitute Consumption for Income
Taxes
The rst tax reform reduces the baseline labor-income taxes by half (from 30 percent to
15 percent). The fall in tax revenue collection is compensated by an endogenous increase
in consumption taxes to balance the budget. The reform is evaluated in a closed and in
3See Conesa and Garriga (2013) for a specic discussion of this issue.
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a small open economy. The last option allows us to control for the impact of changes in
relative prices. Figure 2 describes the nature of the policy change and the evolution of the
main macroeconomic aggregates and individual decisions along the transition path to the
new steady state.
The macroeconomic implications of the reform are straightforward. First, this reform
has an immediate intergenerational redistributive component, since it clearly redistributes
from the old in favor of the relatively young. In addition, the distortions on the labor supply
of the working age people are reduced under the new policy. The reform is not neutral and
aggregate e¢ciency increases. In the long run the economy converges to a steady state with
a higher capital stock and higher wages. The decline in the tax burden of newborn working
generations increases their lifetime utility.
The top part of Figure 3 compares the generational accounts under the baseline policy
and the tax reform. The straight bar in 1995 separates the initial generations alive at the
start of the reform from the newborn cohorts under the new tax policy regime in 2015. The
policy reform increases the tax burden of retired individuals that face higher consumption
taxes than with the baseline policy. This is captured by an upward shift of the generational
metric for the existing cohorts (including some of the middle age workers) at the start of the
reform. The newborn cohorts face lower taxation over their lifetime and this is captured by
a downward shift of the generational accounts.
The bottom part of Figure 3 compares individuals welfare, measured in terms of con-
sumption equivalence, with the change in tax incidence relative to (gross) lifetime income
under the baseline policy. The negative relationship between these lines suggests that the
metrics successfully capture the identity of the winners and losers of the policy reform. Those
who su¤er a higher tax burden are those that indeed su¤er a welfare loss. The newborn co-
horts face a lower tax burden and the initial generations alive bear the cost of the reform.
The cost of the reform is particularly large on retired individuals that have no ability to
avoid consumption taxes. The welfare cost of the reform is lower for individuals that are
already working when the reform takes place. These individuals have the ability to adjust
the labor supply and the pattern of savings over a longer horizon. The metric captures the
decreasing burden for these individuals. In this particular policy experiment there are no
substantial discrepancies between the metrics and welfare measurement, especially for gen-
erations currently alive. This is the case because this reform implies mostly a redistributive
component, especially in the short run. This reform generates non-trivial adjustments in the
relative prices. On impact capital is inelastic and the reduction of labor taxation increases
the labor supply, reducing wages.
To evaluate the impact of changes in relative prices consider the same reform but in
a small open economy. The path of taxes and the main macroeconomic aggregates are
summarized in Figure 4 and the generational accounts and welfare are depicted in Figure 5.
The absence of price e¤ects requires a smaller adjustment of consumption taxes, generating
larger welfare e¤ects relative to the closed economy. The exercise illustrates that the levels of
the generational accounts are a¤ected by the response of relative price, changing the extent
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of redistribution between current and future generations. In this case, the metrics correctly
identify the identity and the approximate magnitude of welfare changes even better when
we abstract from general equilibrium price e¤ects.
4.2 Exogenous Reform 2: Extension of Working Age
In the baseline economy workers have mandatory retirement at 65 years old, after retirement
they start collecting social security payments. In this section we evaluate a policy reform
that eliminates mandatory retirement and allows individuals to collect the retirement pension
while working between ages 65 and 70. The e¢ciency units are assumed to be the same as
for age 65.4 The implications for the tax system and the economy are summarized in Figure
6.
The extension of the working age implies that individuals work a bit more over the
life-cycle but also save more, resulting in a minimal adjustment in relative prices. The
welfare gains associated with the policy reform come from the improved ability to smooth
consumption over the life-cycle. The delay in the retirement age increases the tax revenue
because these workers continue to contribute to the social security system (despite receiving
a retirement transfer) and pay labor income taxes, allowing for a decline in consumption
taxation.
The e¤ects of this policy on the generational accounts and welfare are summarized in
Figure 7. Clearly, the elimination of mandatory retirement increases welfare for all of the
individuals. Individuals already retired when the reform is in place pay lower consumption
taxes and have higher welfare. The utility gains for these cohorts are well captured by the
reduction in their lifetime tax burden. All future generations will pay higher taxes over
the lifetime because the additional year working generates an increase in lifetime taxation.
However, the ability to change the life-cycle prole of consumption and leisure generates
an increase in lifetime utility. Welfare increases despite the increase in taxation, and that
implies a discrepancy between the change in generational accounts and individuals welfare.
Notice that mandatory retirement is equivalent to a 100 percent tax on labor income
after age 65. In that sense, the elimination of compulsory retirement rules is equivalent to
a reduction of the tax from 100 percent to 16 percent, which is the benchmark tax rate
on labor income. Clearly a 100 percent tax on labor income is on the wrong side of the
La¤er curve, and any reduction in that tax rate will increase welfare and tax revenues at
the same time. This e¤ect, even if the response of hours worked is not very large, explains
the divergence (not only in magnitude, but also in sign) between changes in generational
accounts and welfare changes.
These two policy experiments provide some indications of when generational accounts
successfully capture the identity of the cohorts that benet and the magnitude of welfare
changes of policy reforms. The next section performs an additional experiment solving
for the optimal scal policy given an explicit target of intergenerational redistribution of
4The key ndings are qualitatively the same assuming decreasing e¢ciency units after the retirement age.
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welfare changes. In this context, the presence of government debt is a very useful tool for
redistributing welfare gains across di¤erent cohorts.
5 Endogenous Intergenerational Policy Reforms
The use of optimal taxation helps to clarify the distinction between e¢ciency considera-
tions and intergenerational redistribution. The optimal policy brings the economy to the
constrained Pareto frontier (thus maximizing constrained e¢ciency). Changes in the dis-
tribution of social weights allow for the explicit comparison of di¤erent points along that
frontier (intergenerational redistribution).
The key insight is to use optimal scal policy to determine endogenously the least distor-
tionary way of nancing a given level of government expenditures and utility entitlements.
The applications in Conesa and Garriga (2008a,b) identify the best way to nance the
transition from an unfunded social security system to a privatized social security system
guaranteeing Pareto improvements for all current and future cohorts. The experiments in
this section focus on disentangling redistributive implications from e¢ciency implications of
the optimal policy.
The general intuition for this problem is consistent with the previous policy experiments
because the main source of e¢ciency gains comes from the minimization of labor supply
distortions (substitute consumption for income taxes and the extension of working age).
The e¢ciency gains then are redistributed between current and future cohorts through the
optimal use of a debt transfer scheme. The existence of government debt is very useful
because it allows the government to transfer resources across time directly instead of using
the tax system for that purpose.
The distribution of welfare gains associated with the optimal policy is arbitrarily chosen
through the intergenerational weights in the social welfare function and the entitlement or
promise keeping constraint. We use a utilitarian function of the form
P
1
t=1
t 1U(ct; lt),
where the key parameter is  2 (0; 1), the weight on next period generation relative to
today. The social weight on the initial generations alive at the start of the reform at t = 1
is represented using promise keeping constraints:
IX
i=j
si
sj
i jU(ci;i j+1; li;i j+1)  ()bUj; j = 2; :::; I:
The initial generations alive are either currently receiving transfers (retirees) or were
promised some transfers in the near future (current workers). These recipients have no
explicit weight in the objective function, but the promised welfare under the old tax policy
U^j is viewed as an entitlement. The government is committed to deliver some welfare gain of
 units (measured in consumption equivalents) to all initial generations. The function ()
depends on preference parameters and transforms the desired level of consumption equivalent
changes into the correct utility metric. Given our preference specication, a simple formula
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translates welfare gains in consumption equivalent units into utility: () = (1 ).
Timing: At time t = 0; the economy is in the steady state under the baseline policy
and no scal reform has been anticipated by households. At t = 1; the government imple-
ments the optimal policy by determining age-dependent labor income taxes for each cohort,
eliminating mandatory retirement and pensions, and issuing compensatory transfers to the
initial generations nanced with government debt. The aggregate variables adjust over time
until the economy converges to the new steady state under the new optimal policy.
The dynamics of the economy depend entirely on the degree of intergenerational redistri-
bution governed by the pair (; ). These pairs will be constrained to guarantee that future
generations are not worse o¤ than in the initial steady state. For low values of , the long-run
capital stock would be so low that this condition would not be satised. This restricts the
range of admissible values for  to values high enough so that the steady state solution of
the government problem for a newborn yields higher utility than in the benchmark economy.
Similarly, the level of welfare gains accruing to initial generations has an upper bound that
guarantees that the promised utility constraint is not violated along the transition path. If
the pair (; ) cannot guarantee both conditions, then the policy is dismissed as infeasible
from a redistributive point of view.
Following the primal approach, the programming problem that determines the optimal
policy can be written as:
max
P
1
t=1
t 1U(ct; lt);
s:t:
PI
i=1icit + (1 + x)(1 + n)kt+1   (1  )kt + gt  f(kt;
PI
i=1i"ilit); ; 8t;
IX
i=1
si
i 1

ci;t+i 1Uci;t+i 1 + li;t+i 1Uli;t+i 1

= 0; t  1;
IX
i=j
si
sj
i j

ci;i j+1Uci;i j+1 + li;i j+1Uli;i j+1

=
Ucj;1
1 +  c1
[(1+(1  k1)(fk;t ))baj;1+epi;1]; j = 2; :::; I;
Uc1;t
'1Uc2;t+1
=
Uc2;t
'2Uc3;t+1
= ::: =
UcI 1;t
'I 1UcI;t+1
=

1 + x
[1 + (1   k1)(fk;t+1   )]; t  1;
IX
i=j
si
sj
i jU(ci;i j+1; li;i j+1)  ()bUj; j = 2; :::; I:
The optimization problem takes as given k1; 
c
1; and 
k
1 and solves for the compen-
satory transfers epi;t 2 R+ to each of the initial generations alive and individual allocations
ffci;t; li;tg
I
i=1g
1
t=1.
The rst constraint is the feasibility constraint. The second and the third are the imple-
mentability conditions for both newborns and cohorts initially alive. The fourth constraint
reects the assumption that capital income taxes are always constant. The fth constraint
is the promise-keeping constraint of the initial cohorts that we discussed before. There are
two reasons to abstract from capital income taxes. First, the additional welfare gains associ-
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ated with this tax instrument are negligible, especially once you allow for age-specic labor
income taxes (a detailed discussion is Conesa and Garriga, 2008a). Second, abstracting from
the choice of capital-income taxes eases the comparison with the case of exogenous reforms,
where we did not use this tax instrument either.
The optimal intergenerational policy is solved for di¤erent combinations of  2 f0:97; 0:98g
and  2 f1:00; 1:02; 1:04g. For the parameterization of the benchmark economy, the range
of feasible values that can generate widespread welfare gains is quite limited. Values of 
slightly below 0.97 imply that it is impossible to guarantee that generations born in the fu-
ture steady state would be better o¤ with the reform. Similarly, it is not possible to provide
to the initial generations welfare gains larger than 4% if future cohorts must be guaranteed
a level of welfare at least as high as with the benchmark policy. Values of  below 1 would
imply a partial default on the utility entitlements of the initial cohorts.
For the evaluation of the metrics, it is useful to distinguish between what we call Pareto
e¢cient reformsand Pareto redistributive reforms. By the rst we refer to the implemen-
tation of optimal policies relative to the benchmark economy, i.e. bringing the economy from
an interior point to the constrained Pareto frontier. By Pareto redistributive reforms,we
will refer to comparisons of the optimal policy when we change the distribution of welfare
gains, i.e. we compare di¤erent points in the constrained Pareto frontier.
For the case of  = 0:97 and  = 1:00; the dynamic paths of generational accounts and
welfare under the baseline economy and the optimal intergenerational policy are shown in
Figure 8. Under the benchmark policy the welfare of current and future generations remains
unchanged and the generational accounts are the same for all newborn cohorts.5 The optimal
intergenerational policy compensates the initial generations alive and their welfare is exactly
the one of the benchmark economy. Given the discount rate of the government most of
the e¢ciency gains are distributed to the newborn cohorts around 2005-25. Notice that the
value of  = 0:97 leaves future newborns with a level of welfare very close to that of the
benchmark economy. Lower values of  would imply welfare losses for these cohorts and are
not considered in our exercise.
The bottom panel of Figure 8 reveals that the generational accounts fail to capture
the identity and the magnitude of the welfare changes. By construction, all the initial
cohorts are indi¤erent between the baseline and the optimal intergenerational policy, but
the generational accounts imply that individuals born before 1980 are paying the cost of the
reform (their tax burden increases). The oldest cohorts who were net recipients (negative
generational accounts) will receive less, and those who are net contributors will contribute
more.
To understand the main nding it is important to identify the sources of e¢ciency gains,
which lie in the elimination of distortions. During the transition path, hours worked increase
for almost all cohorts (initial and future newborns). The reduction in leisure is compensated
5In a changing environment (for example due to a demographic transition), it would be necessary to
specify the path of policy for the baseline economy, and utility entitlements would be changing for future
generations.
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by an increase in consumption, which is large for the generations very close to retirement
(age 55). As a result individuals are either indi¤erent (or better o¤ in the case of future
generations), while they bear a larger tax burden. The logic is the same as for our experiment
of eliminating the distortion associated with mandatory retirement.
Now consider Pareto redistributive reforms that vary the extent of welfare gains for
existing cohorts (adjusting  > 1) for a given intergenerational discount rate  = 0:97: Figure
9 clearly shows an intergenerational tension: As the compensation of the initial generations
increases, the welfare gains of newborns during the transition periods needs to be reduced.
As the size of the entitlements of existing generations increases, the newborn generations
during the transition will face higher taxation to pay for these obligations and hence their
welfare gains are smaller. When comparing across these di¤erent policy options, we see
that the magnitude and the identity of welfare changes are consistent with the generational
accounts.
The larger the value of the parameter , the more initial cohorts are compensated in
terms of consumption. However, the shape of the consumption and leisure prole is not
signicantly a¤ected by the value of the parameter  (see Figure 10). The life-cycle patterns
of consumption and hours worked of future generations have a very similar shape. The
optimal policy adjusts the distribution of welfare gains through the use of debt, by repaying
the debt earlier or later.
The parameter  is very critical in determining the distributional gains of the immediate
and future newborns. The intergenerational tension between the short-run and the long-
run is more evident when the intergenerational weight is increased from  = 0:97 to  =
0:98. In this case, the policymaker is more patient and attaches a much larger weight
to future generations, but the ability to deliver more consumption depends on the size of
the entitlements to the existing cohorts. The distribution of welfare and the generational
accounts in this case are summarized in Figure 11. The shift in the weight of the social
welfare function illustrates a clear intergenerational trade-o¤ in the assignment of welfare
gains. For the low lambda, all the welfare gains are front loaded whereas in this case the
gains are back loaded with long-run values around 10 percent. The choice of lambda a¤ects
the intergenerational distribution of welfare gains, but the evaluation of the reforms using
generational accounts reveals the same problem in both cases. The new tax policies generate
sizable e¢ciency gains, and as a result the generational accounts fail to identify the cohorts
that benet from the reform. In the case of redistributive reformsshown in Figure 12, the
metrics seem to perform as well as in the case illustrated in Figure 9. Conditional on the
reform, changes in the redistribution of welfare gains are well captured by the generational
accounts. Increasing the entitlements of the existing cohorts makes the relative relationship
with the government more favorable for these individuals and less favorable for future cohorts.
The compensation scheme for the entitlement programs has important implications for
the macroeconomy both in the short and long-run. The macroeconomic aggregates depend
critically on the values of  and . For example, the combination of a low value of  and a
high value of  implies that the government places a higher weight on the current generations
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(relative to future ones), and the initial generations alive need to be overly compensated.
As a result, resources for the current generations will increase relative to those for future
cohorts, which must devote a large fraction of their total resources to meet the interest
payments of the bonds originated to compensate the initial cohorts. This trade-o¤ is very
explicit in Figure 13 that shows the dynamics of aggregate output and the debt-to-output
ratio.
In this model, despite the di¤erent dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates (i.e., output
and debt), the optimal tax rates solving the governments problem are not very di¤erent.
Figure 14 plots the evolution of the average labor income tax in each case. The optimal
labor supply distortions imply subsidies, especially for the oldest cohorts during the initial
periods on the transition path. Over time, the initial cohorts disappear and it is optimal to
tax labor again, repaying some fraction of the debt issued. The optimal repayment of debt
depends on the intergenerational weights, but the pattern of optimal labor income taxes is
essentially the same.
6 Conclusions
One of the most widely used tools for policy evaluation in practice is generational accounting.
This approach has the advantage that the accounts are easy to compute, since no assumptions
about preferences or technology are needed.
This paper evaluates the ability of generational accounting metrics to capture the iden-
tity of the cohorts who benet from or bear the cost of policy reforms. Using data generated
by the model provides the perfect laboratory to measure tax incidence. Our analysis sug-
gests that when the policy reforms imply changes in economic e¢ciency, the generational
accounting methodology fails to identify the magnitude of the welfare changes and even the
sign of welfare changes for many cohorts. In contrast, when the policy reform involves only
intergenerational redistribution, the generational accounts provide reasonable estimates of
the magnitude of welfare changes for all cohorts. We reach this conclusion after comparing
welfare implications of our articial economy with the generational accounts constructed
from our model-generated data.
Improvements in e¢ciency often involve a change in the age-prole of consumption and
hours worked. In contrast, redistributive reforms shift up the age-prole of consumption of
some cohorts relative to others. That is the reason why generational accounting is biased in
evaluating the welfare implications of e¢ciency enhancing reforms. Our quantitative results
show that the bias can be large.
In the end, in terms of policy evaluation in practice, it seems very hard to determine ex-
ante whether or not a particular policy proposal involves e¢ciency considerations in addition
to the more obvious redistributive considerations. Moreover, forecasting behavioral responses
seems extremely hard without the use of a model. Probably only the full specication and
analysis of a model can help us in determining the e¢ciency impact and behavioral responses
of policies, but in doing so the model would directly provide welfare measures to assess the
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impact of the policy reform.
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Benchmark Economy Generational Accounts (GA)
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Figure 2: Substituting Consumption for Labor Income Taxes
Reform 1 (Closed Economy)
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Figure 3: Generational Accounts and Welfare
Reform 1 (Closed Economy)
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Figure 4: Substituting Consumption for Labor Income Taxes
Reform 1 (Open Economy)
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Figure 5: Generational Accounts and Welfare - Reform 1 (Open Economy)
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Figure 6: Extension Retirement Age - Reform 2
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Figure 7: Generational Accounts and Welfare - Reform 2
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Figure 8: Generational Accounts and Welfare
Optimal reform. Low Lambda ( = 0:97)
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Figure 9: Comparison Across Redistributive Reforms (4)
Low Lambda ( = 0:97)
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Figure 10: Optimal Consumption and Labor Supply. Low lambda
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Figure 11: Generational Accounts and Welfare
Optimal Reform. High Lambda ( = 0:98)
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Figure 12: Comparison Across Redistributive Reforms (4)
High Lambda ( = 0:98)
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Year Cohort Born
Pe
rc
e
n
t
Welfare (∆κ=0%)
Welfare (∆κ=2%)
Welfare (∆κ=4%)
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
P
e
rc
e
n
t
Year Cohort Born
Gen. Acc. (∆κ=0%)
Gen. Acc. (∆κ=2%)
Gen. Acc. (∆κ=4%)
Note: 4 Welfare measured in equivalent variation,
4 Gen. Acc. normalized by lifetime net income benchmark
30
Figure 13: Implications of Discounting for Aggregates
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Figure 14: Optimal Policy (Age-Dependent Labor Taxes)
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